Utility and Eudaimonia: Ethics and Well-Being in the Aristotelian and Utilitarian Moral Traditions

Abstract

My dissertation launches a broader project aimed at advancing the philosophical dialectic between Aristotelianism and utilitarianism, arguing with respect to three specific issues that their respective central commitments are not essentially opposed, and their respective central challenges can be better addressed by attention to their apparent rival’s insights. My Preface briefly contextualizes my project within the concerns of normal people and within recent scholarship. In Chapter One, I explain the MacIntyrean conception of “traditions of moral inquiry” that underlies the project, propose a working outline of the central commitments and challenges of Aristotelianism and utilitarianism, then moderate the two traditions’ conceptions of moral inquiry as such. Chapters Two and Three address two of the most important conflict points between the traditions—value plurality and the criticism of human dispositions. In both cases, I argue that the two traditions can share a middle ground between untenable extremes. In my Afterword, I describe what I take myself to have accomplished and outline what most urgently needs to be accomplished next in the Aristotelian-utilitarian dialectic.