Working in conflict: how bureaucrats navigate accountability pressures

Abstract

Bureaucrats make policy. So, understanding their motivations behind discretionary choices, or ultimate decisions about their role and agency are pivotal toward examining policy outcomes. This dissertation attempts to expand our understanding of state bureaucrats, possibly working under conflict, to grapple with nuance much of the literature neglects. The research undertakes existing frameworks like Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect to understand how state bureaucrats react to agency or policy changes, and how these behaviors can be results of accountability pressures between the state and federal levels of government. The results suggest bureaucrats navigate their complicated landscapes through a number of adaptations to the environment such as network building and community capacity, as well as exercising Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect. Finally, the research concludes with considerations of existing theoretical developments to adjust to the ever-growing complexity of policy implementation in a time of increasingly compound policy problems.