An Excellence-Based View of Virtuous Motivation

Abstract

In my dissertation I explore the nature of virtuous motivation. The output of this exploration is a novel account of virtuous motivation which I argue is preferable to approaches currently available within contemporary virtue ethics. More specifically, I aim to account for the kinds of reasons that motivate virtuous individuals when they act virtuously, which involves identifying the explicit reasons that motivate them when they act as well as implicit or deeper motives that are likewise operative, although in a different way. Throughout my work, I argue that there is a central concept or specific kind of motivating reason that consistently motivates virtuous persons when they act virtuously. This is the motive to exhibit excellence or virtue in some way whenever they act. I also refer to this as the concept of “agential excellence.” Because of this I call my view the excellence-based view of virtuous motivation, since the motive for excellence is both present and sufficiently motivating in every case of virtuous motivation. Although the excellence-based view is proposed as a novel approach to the topic of virtuous motivation, it borrows its conceptual framework from Aristotle’s account of virtue. However, I depart from this framework in a significant way. Aristotle thought that because eudaimonia (or a flourishing life) was our ultimate end, all of our choices and actions were ultimately for the sake of this end. For our motives, this meant that whatever choices we made and the reasons motivating our actions, these were motivated by our ultimate desire to flourish: including the motive to be virtuous. Several contemporary virtue-ethicists reflect Aristotle’s belief that eudaimonia plays a necessary role in the motivational structure of virtuous persons (I refer to these as eudaimonist accounts of virtuous motivation). One way they argue this is through the role eudaimonia must play in our practical rationality, specifically in terms of being the ultimate terminus within our reasoning. If eudaimonia is our ultimate end, then our choices and motivating reasons for whatever we do are rational insofar as they are connected to or grounded in this desire to flourish. And if our motives are to be virtuous, they must be rational in this sense. Ultimately, when constructing an account of virtuous motivation, the default position for contemporary virtue-ethicists that follow in Aristotle’s footsteps is to claim that eudaimonia is both central to and necessary for displaying virtuous motivation. In chapter 1, I both challenge the eudaimonist view of virtuous motivation and motivate my excellence-based view. To do this, I use an example inspired by a collection of letters written by several men and women who opposed the Nazi regime and were subsequently imprisoned and executed for their resistance. I refer to this example as the Letter-Writers case. The example is intended to demonstrate how the flourishing life may not have been possible for these individuals, who I take to be virtuous, but they were still motivated to maintain their character and act nobly, despite the horrific nature of their circumstances. I argue that it is plausible that thoughts of flourishing were not decisive in motivating the Letter-Writers to act and live in a virtuous way within this situation. In other words, they exhibited virtuous motivation without being motivated by eudaimonia. This paves the way for an excellence-based view, which places “agential excellence” rather than eudaimonia, as the central concept for understanding virtuous motivation. The concept of agential excellence is inspired by Aristotle’s view of virtue, according to which virtue is understood as the excellent functioning of human beings which makes them good human beings. Basically, humans can display excellence through cultivating and maintaining virtuous character traits, acting virtuously in consistent way, and through living excellent or virtuous lives. With this concept in hand, I go on to argue that the motivating reasons of the Letter-Writers can more plausibly be connected to and grounded in the concept of agential excellence, or excellence-based reasons, rather than eudaimonia and eudaimonist reasons. Chapter 2 extends the challenge against eudaimonist virtue ethics, specifically regarding their account of virtuous motivation towards others. Recall that the eudaimonist claims that all moral motivation ultimately traces back to a desire to flourish, which naturally extends to our motives to respect and act on behalf of others. However, much like in chapter 1, there are cases of individuals acting virtuously towards others who are not also motivated by their pursuit of their own eudaimonia. In other words, virtuous persons can act and be motivated in a virtuous way towards others without also considering their own flourishing. In light of this, I argue that the eudaimonist cannot account for such cases, insofar as they insist on a strong link between virtuous motivation and flourishing. I propose that the excellence-based view can better handle cases of virtuous motivation towards others. In such cases, virtuous actions towards others are motivated by a deep care and concern for them, combined with a desire to express that care excellently. Where deep other-concern and a desire to express that concern in a virtuous way are present, virtuous motivation emerges. For chapter 3, we take a bit of a detour. In chapters 1 and 2, virtuous motivation was largely influenced by the exercise of one’s practical rationality. And since there is a form of practical rationality or deliberation that is characteristic of virtuous persons and since both Aristotle and several contemporary virtue-ethicists claim that eudaimonia must guide this deliberation, the argument in chapter 3 challenges this view. I do this by considering cases where virtuous persons deliberate excellently about how to act and live but do not employ a conception of a flourishing life when doing so. Perhaps such individuals deliberate in accordance with what is virtuous to do, what expresses a virtuous character, or what is consistent with a virtuous life. These considerations led me to propose an “excellence-based view of practical wisdom”, which claims that practical wisdom can always be guided by the concept of agential excellence, whether this is situated within a broader desire to flourish. And when guided by agential excellence, one can deliberate effectively to determine what’s best to do for any circumstance. Thus, the excellence-based view provides a plausible alternative to eudaimonist accounts of practical wisdom. I also argue that an excellence-based view is preferable to the eudaimonist view, since agential excellence can provide consistent deliberative guidance across different lives and when agential excellence guides practically wise deliberation, this still positions us well to attain a flourishing life. In chapter 4, I return to the main discussion of virtuous motivation and consider alternative virtue-ethical approaches to the topic. The alternatives I have mind are Stoicism (in both ancient and contemporary form), Michael Slote’s care-based ethics, and Christine Swanton’s target-centered virtue ethics. The goal of this chapter was to illustrate how an excellence-based view of virtuous motivation fares better than these alternative views. To do this, I examine each alternative view to show what their account of virtuous motivation would look like alongside its merits and deficiencies. The upshot of considering these alternative views is that an excellence-based view can incorporate the attractive elements of each view, it can avoid the problems of such views, and, most importantly, can capture what can be found in every instance of virtuous motivation.