Negative expressions as parts of logos in Plato’s Sophist

Abstract

In the thesis, I offer an interpretation of the middle part of the Sophist, according to which its goal is to construct an account of meaningful language (logos) that welcomes negativity. I argue that non being is a part of logos in two senses: as negative predicates (257b-c) and as false statements (259e-263d). Following the incompatible property range view proposed by Lesley Brown, I argue that Plato’s account of negative predication is about internal negation, as opposed to external negation defended by scholars such as G.E.L. Owen. Further, I argue that according to Plato, meaningful language is a proper mixture of heterofunctional parts of speech: subjects and predicates. The improper mixture of a subject with a predicate results in a false statement. However, a false statement is still a part of logos, because it takes the wrong predicate from the right predicate-range.