Fuel for Fake News: Emotion and Partisan Bias in the Processing of Political Misinformation
| dc.contributor.advisor | Mayeux, Lara | |
| dc.contributor.author | Chen, Tammy | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Bessarabova, Elena | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Cai, Huajian | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Song, Hairong | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Leshner, Glenn | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2025-12-22T17:07:08Z | |
| dc.date.embargoExpiration | ||
| dc.date.issued | 2025 | |
| dc.date.proquestAvailable | 01/01/2025 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2025-12-22T17:07:08Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | Political misperceptions shaped by strong emotional experiences and partisan biases can undermine individuals’ ability to distinguish misinformation from facts (Garrett & Weeks, 2013; Nyhan & Reifler, 2015; Weeks, 2015). Prior research demonstrates that emotional states (Lerner & Keltner, 2000; Lerner et al., 2015; Nabi, 2002), congruence between misinformation and preexisting beliefs (Taber & Lodge, 2006), and the strength of partisan identity – conceptualized as affective polarization (Lelkes, 2016; Sanchez & Dunning, 2021) – each shape vulnerability to political misinformation. The present dissertation investigated how three discrete emotions that differ in valence and motivational orientation – anger, fear, and joy – distinctly influence (a) accuracy in evaluating political misinformation, (b) time required to reach a judgment, (c) confidence in judgment, (d) skepticism toward statements regarded as true, and (e) willingness to share statements regarded as true. Congruence between misinformation and preexisting beliefs and affective polarization were included as moderators in a series of moderation analyses. Across a sample of US adults (N = 600), fear consistently suppressed willingness to share political information judged as true, regardless of affective polarization level. Anger amplified confidence and willingness to share among individuals high in affective polarization but decreased both outcomes among those low in affective polarization. Finally, higher congruence between misinformation and preexisting beliefs predicted poorer discernment between facts and misinformation. Implications of the findings on the affective processing of political misinformation are discussed in detail. | |
| dc.identifier.orcid | 0009-0004-3851-408X | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://shareok.org//handle/11244/341771 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | University of Oklahoma – Graduate College | |
| dc.subject | Psychology | |
| dc.subject | Social psychology | |
| dc.subject | Communication | |
| dc.subject | affective polarization | |
| dc.subject | affective processing | |
| dc.subject | emotion | |
| dc.subject | fake news | |
| dc.subject | political misinformation | |
| dc.subject | political psychology | |
| dc.thesis.degree | D.Phil. | |
| dc.title | Fuel for Fake News: Emotion and Partisan Bias in the Processing of Political Misinformation | |
| ou.group | Psychology: Arts & Sciences |